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Sword and Shield: The Georgia
Supreme Court Adopts Third-Party
Waiver of Attorney-Client
Privilege*
I. INTRODUCTION
The attorney-client privilege is generally held out as a sacred
instrument (a shield) reserved for clients and used by attorneys for the
benefit of those clients. Persons untrained in the law tend to have a basic
understanding of what the attorney-client privilege is and can often
explain in a rudimentary sense what it protects. What few non-lawyers
realize, however, is that the privilege is not absolute, and is waivable
under certain, limited, circumstances. Now, it seems that shield is losing
its integrity in the realm of legal malpractice.
In January 2020, the Georgia Supreme Court ruled in Hill, Kertscher
& Wharton v. Moody1 that where a client sues a former firm for legal
malpractice, the waiver of attorney-client privilege, also known as the
“offensive use” doctrine, applies to third parties, unnamed firms, and
other lawyers that represented the malpractice plaintiff in the
underlying litigation or transaction, and not just the firm being sued.2 At
first glance Hill seems to be a sweeping ruling, applying to any and all
lawyers or firms involved in a legal malpractice suit. In reality, Hill is a
narrow decision that seriously implicates the Georgia Supreme Court’s
reaffirmation that attorney-client privilege may be waived by former
clients that put prior representation at issue. The decision strengthens a
powerful defensive mechanism in the defendant-attorney’s arsenal when
they become the target of malpractice litigation. At first glance readers
may fall into a trap, assuming that Hill dramatically expands the
third-party waiver of attorney-client privilege. However, a close reading
* Juris Doctor Candidate, 2022, Mercer University School of Law. Articles Editor, Mercer
Law Review, vol. 73. President, Mercer Trial Lawyers Association.
1 308 Ga. 74, 839 S.E.2d 535 (2020).
2 Id.
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of Hill shows that the Georgia Supreme Court actually reaffirms and
bolsters the third-party waiver as factually dependent, while upholding
the purpose of the attorney-client privilege and protecting Georgia
attorneys. The decision in Hill has flown under the radar, but should be
viewed under a microscope, and reviewed by evidence and legal ethics
scholars, not only in the state of Georgia, but across the United States.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
While the facts of Hill are somewhat complex and contain several
parties, it is important to focus on the plaintiff’s relationship with the
firms or individual lawyers that represented him in the matters that gave
rise to the malpractice action. Plaintiff, Daryl Moody (Moody) and two
businesses, Mast Nine, Inc. (Mast Nine), and UAS Investments, LLC
(UAS) invested in a company named Leucadia Group, LLC (Leucadia
Group), a California-based company owned by Robert Miller (Miller) and
Sean Frisbee. Moody, Mast Nine, and UAS sought legal advice from the
law firm of Hill, Kertscher & Wharton, LLP (HKW) about terminating
Miller, the sitting president of Leucadia Group.3
HKW advised the parties to appoint Moody to Leucadia Group’s Board
of Directors; form a new company named Leucadia Group Investment
Holdings, Inc.; issue shares to the new company; and, finally, terminate
Miller. Moody followed the advice. HKW further recommended filing suit
against Miller and Leucadia Group in Fulton County Superior Court.
Miller responded by filing his own lawsuit in California against Moody.4
Despite specific requests from Moody, HKW failed to assert certain
defenses, including a defense that the California court lacked personal
jurisdiction over Moody. Further, HKW was disqualified from the Fulton
County lawsuit after it failed to disclose or obtain written waivers of
potential or actual conflicts of interest from the prior or ongoing
representation of Leucadia Group and Miller. HKW withdrew from the
California lawsuit. The California court ruled that the appointment of
Moody to the Board, the issuance of shares to Leucadia Investment
Holdings, Inc., and Miller’s termination were all void.5
Moody, Mast Nine, and UAS then filed suit in Cobb County, Georgia
State Court against HKW for legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary
duty based on legal advice and services in the matter involving Leucadia
Group, and the Fulton County and California lawsuits. HKW filed its
Answer, counterclaimed for unpaid legal fees, and admitted many of the

Id. at 74, 839 S.E.2d at 536.
Id. at 74–75, 839 S.E.2d at 536–37.
5 Id. at 75, 839 S.E.2d at 537.
3
4
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factual allegations in the Complaint. HKW asserted several defenses
including that non-parties caused some or all of the damages, and that
plaintiffs had separate counsel–Holland & Knight, LLP–who provided
“confirmatory advice.” HKW further alleged that Moody directed the firm
to “follow the instructions” of Holland & Knight, LLP (Holland & Knight)
over the course of the representation of Moody.6
During discovery, HKW served a request for production of documents
on non-party Holland & Knight. The request included: (1) Files for any
corporate work performed for plaintiffs regarding Leucadia Group,
Miller, etc.; (2) Holland & Knight’s litigation file for the Fulton County
lawsuit; (3) Holland & Knight’s litigation file for the California lawsuit;
and (4) All correspondence related to that corporate work and the Fulton
County and California lawsuits, including communications between
plaintiffs and Holland & Knight.7
Holland & Knight produced many redacted documents, but withheld
others based on specific objections including the attorney-client privilege
and work-product protection. Moody as well as the other plaintiffs filed a
motion for protective order on the same grounds. HKW argued in its
response that filing of a complaint for legal malpractice based on HKW’s
legal advice was an implied waiver of the attorney-client privilege and
work-product doctrine as to all attorneys and law firms involved in the
underlying suit, including Holland & Knight.8
The trial court found that Holland & Knight as well as HKW
represented Moody in connection with the legal malpractice complaint,
and found that the plaintiffs waived attorney-client privilege and
work-product protection as to Holland & Knight. The trial court granted
Plaintiffs’ request for a certificate of immediate review. The Georgia
Court of Appeals granted an application for interlocutory appeal, and
reversed the trial court’s order denying Plaintiffs’ motion for protective
order. The court expressed doubt that the waiver extends as far as other
attorneys who represented the client in the same underlying matter, and
concluded there was no basis for finding implied waiver of attorney-client
privilege between Holland & Night, and Moody.9
The Georgia Supreme Court decided the case as a matter of first
impression, holding that even though a client chooses not to sue certain
lawyers or firms that represented the client in an underlying matter,
implied waiver of attorney-client privilege extends to those lawyers and
firms as well as those that the former client chose to sue. The court held,
Id..
Id. at 75–76, 839 S.E.2d at 537.
8 Id. at 76, 839 S.E.2d at 537–38.
9 Id. at 77-78, 839 S.E.2d at 538.
6
7
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“[W]hen a client sues his former attorney for legal malpractice, the
implied waiver of attorney-client privilege extends to the client’s
communications with other attorneys who represented the client with
respect to the same underlying transaction or litigation.” 10 11
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Attorney-client privilege
The attorney-client privilege is codified in Georgia under O.C.G.A.
§ 24-5-50112 which states: “(a) There are certain admissions and
communications excluded from evidence on grounds of public policy,
including . . . (2) [c]ommunications between attorney and client . . . .”13
The privilege is narrowly construed in Georgia due to the fact that it
operates to exclude evidence and impede the truth-seeking process.14 The
purpose of the privilege is to:
[E]ncourage full and frank communication between attorneys and
their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the
observance of law and administration of justice. The privilege
recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and
that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer’s being fully
informed by the client.15

The attorney-client privilege originated in evidence law. However, it is
often confused as a product of legal ethics because of its relationship with
confidentiality in the Georgia Supreme Court’s Rules of Professional
Conduct.16 The rules state only that, “The attorney-client privilege
applies in judicial and other proceedings in which a lawyer may be called
as a witness or otherwise required to produce evidence concerning a
client.”17 Client confidentiality is broader, and encompasses the attorneyclient privilege according to the Rules.18
10 The court vacated the court of appeals’ judgment with regard to the work-product
doctrine on other grounds, therefore, a discussion of the work-product doctrine is outside of
the scope of this casenote.
11 Id. at 74, 839 S.E.2d at 536.
12 O.C.G.A. § 24-5-501 (2014).
13 Id.
14 St. Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 293 Ga. 419,
422, 746 S.E.2d 98, 103 (2013).
15 308 Ga. at 78–79, 839 S.E.2d at 539 (quoting St. Simons Waterfront, LLC, 293 Ga. at
422, 746 S.E.2d at 103.
16 Ga. R. & Regs. St. Bar 1.6 cmt. 5 (2015).
17 Id.
18 Id.
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Finally, the attorney-client privilege often arises in the context of
gathering evidence, or “discovery.”19 During discovery, “[p]arties may
obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant
to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . .”20
B. Waiver
The attorney-client privilege is not absolute, and may be waived if
there is a “voluntary relinquishment of a known right and may be
established by express statements or implied by conduct.”21 Implied
waiver is shown by “decisive, unequivocal conduct reasonably inferring
the intent to waive.”22 In other words, under Georgia law, disclosure of
privileged communication may waive the attorney-client privilege.23 It is
generally accepted that the attorney-client privilege belongs to the client,
and not the attorney.24 If a client does not wish to disclose certain
privileged information from a previous suit, they must be careful not to
impliedly waive privilege through third-party waiver often called
offensive use doctrine, which recognizes that when a litigant places
information protected by privilege at issue through an affirmative act for
their own benefit, they waive the privilege.25 Courts have recognized that
allowing the litigant to claim privilege in such a situation would be
manifestly unfair to the opposing party.26
Implied waiver is often seen in professional malpractice suits,
specifically when a former client sues their attorney for breach of contract
or legal malpractice.27 In Daughtry v. Cobb,28 an attorney sued a client
for breach of contract. The client counterclaimed inducement by
fraudulent representations of the attorney. The trial court allowed the
attorney to take the stand and testify even though the testimony was
about privileged communications between the attorney and the client.29
The Georgia Supreme Court ruled that the attorney-client privilege was

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-26 (2020).
Id. (emphasis added).
21 Kennestone Hosp. v. Hopson, 273 Ga. 145, 148, 538 S.E.2d 742, 745 (2000).
22 Id.
23 Osborn v. State, 233 Ga. App. 257, 260, 5o4 S.E.2d 74, 77 (1998).
24 Id.
25 Christenbury v. Locke Lord Bissell & Liddell, LLP, 285 F.R.D. 675, 681 (N.D. Ga.
2012).
26 Id. (quoting Cox v. Administrator U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386 (11th Cir.
1994)).
27 Christenbury, 285 F.R.D. at 682.
28 189 Ga. 113, 5 S.E.2d 352 (1939).
29 Id. at 114, 5 S.E.2d at 353.
19
20
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waived “where the client, in an action against the attorney, charges
negligence or malpractice, or fraud, or other professional misconduct. In
such cases it would be a manifest injustice to allow the client to take
advantage of the rule . . . .”30
C. The Trial Court And Its Reliance On Christenbury
In Hill, the trial court found that Moody and the other plaintiffs
waived their attorney-client privilege concerning Holland & Knight by
asserting the legal malpractice claim against HKW, because it was
“undisputed that Holland & Knight together with HKW represented
Moody in connection with the matters that are the subject of the legal
malpractice complaint . . . .” 31 The trial court relied heavily on
Christenbury v. Locke Lord Bissell & Liddell, LLP.32
In Christenbury, the plaintiff spoke with an attorney, Terry Lustig
(Lustig), about obtaining a tax-favorable insurance and financial
product, which would be bought with the recent proceeds from the sale of
certain business assets. On Christenbury’s behalf, Lustig obtained a tax
opinion letter from the law firm, Locke Lord Bissell & Liddell, LLP
(Locke Lord Bissell), stating that the transaction Lustig proposed
qualified for federal income tax deduction and was not a tax shelter.
Subsequent to the opinion letter, Christenbury purchased the
recommended financial instrument from Fidelity. Thereafter,
Christenbury received a letter from Locke Lord Bissell stating that they
had learned some of the material facts regarding the “[p]olicy and the
related reinsurance and guarantee structure do not appear as they were
represented to us as stated in the Opinion.” The letter further stated that
Locke Lord Bissell may be required to withdraw the Opinion and that it
should not be relied on.33
Upon receipt of the letter, Christenbury tried to terminate the Trust
instrument he purchased from Fidelity and recover $2.5 million he had
spent to purchase the Trust.34 He brought suit against Locke Lord Bissell
alleging: (1) breach of contract; (2) professional negligence; (3) breach of
fiduciary duty; and (4) negligent misrepresentation.35 During discovery,
Locke Lord Bissell sought documents provided to Christenbury by Lustig
Id. at 118, 5 S.E.2d at 355.
308 Ga. at 76, 839 S.E.2d at 538.
32 285 F.R.D. 675 (N.D. Ga. 2012).
33 Id. at 678.
34 Id. at 678–79 (At the time the trial court decided Christenbury, Plaintiff had a pending
lawsuit against Fidelity who he sued to recover the $2.5 million he had spent on the Trust.
Plaintiff later sued Lustig in Texas as well).
35 Id. at 679.
30
31

2021

SWORD AND SHIELD

1471

as well as another firm, Crozier & Associates, whom Christenbury
retained subsequent to receiving the letter that rescinded the Opinion.
Locke Lord Bissell specifically sought communications with Lustig
relating to the decision to participate in the Trust transaction as well as
post-transaction communications with Lustig and Crozier. Christenbury
objected and Locke Lord Bissell moved to compel production of the
documents.36
Holding that Christenbury waived attorney-client privilege based on
the offensive use doctrine,37 the court found that “Georgia courts have
consistently affirmed that the attorney-client privilege may be impliedly
waived, ‘when a client charges negligence, malpractice or other
professional misconduct in an action against the attorney.’”38 In
addressing whether or not offensive use doctrine applies to third-party
attorneys, the court recognized that the question was of first impression,
but accepted the Supreme Court of Washington’s expansion of the
implied waiver in malpractice suits to communications with third-party
attorney’s.39 Citing three federal cases from other jurisdictions, the court
found that “Plaintiffs placed their communications with Lustig at issue
and waived privilege to at least a limited extent,” and also found that
“Plaintiffs can accuse more than one attorney of malpractice[,] [b]ut in
doing so here they put at issue whether and to what extent each
attorney’s advice actually caused their loss and/or are responsible for a
share of damages.”40 In Hill, the Georgia Court of Appeals did not rely on
Christenbury and held otherwise.
D. The Georgia Court of Appeals
On interlocutory appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court’s order denying Moody’s motion for protective order.41 Citing
Waldrip, the court recognized that Plaintiffs waived attorney-client
privilege between themselves and Defendants, but expressed doubt as to
whether they did so with regard to other attorneys or law firms.42
Further, the court pointed out, “the Supreme Court of Georgia has
indicated implied waivers of the attorney/client privilege should be

Id. at 679–80.
Id. at 684.
38 Id. (citing Waldrip v. Head, 272 Ga. 572, 532 S.E.2d 380 (2000)).
39 Id. at 682.
40 Id. at 683–84.
41 308 Ga. at 77, 839 S.E.2d at 538.
42 Moody v. Hill, Kertscher & Wharton, LLP, 346 Ga. App. 129, 130, 813 S.E.2d 790, 791
(2018).
36
37
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narrowly drawn, limited to the specific claims of attorney malfeasance.”43
The court of appeals also distinguished Christenbury by pointing out that
Christenbury also sued the third-party attorney in a different court.44
The court’s emphasis, however, was the fact that the trial court in
Christenbury found that the plaintiff waived privilege with regard to the
third-party for any “communications and materials generated by the nonparty third-party attorney during the subject transaction.”45 Based on
this analysis the court held that the implied waiver did not apply to posttransactions and materials, and considering Moody engaged Holland &
Knight after the alleged malpractice, the implied waiver did not apply.46
E. Treatment In Other Jurisdictions
As a case of first impression in Georgia, the Georgia Supreme Court
searched outside of the State to inform its ruling in Hill,47 and
understanding how other jurisdictions view the implied waiver of
attorney-client privilege is helpful when determining why the court ruled
a particular way. In Pappas v. Holloway,48 the Washington Supreme
Court held that former clients’ malpractice suit against their former
attorney was an implied waiver of attorney-client privilege as to all
attorneys who represented the client in the underlying litigation.49 The
defendants Harold and Rosemarie Holloway (the Holloways) sold
diseased cattle to a number of purchasers who subsequently sued. The
Holloways hired several attorneys to defend them in the different suits
including John Pappas (Pappas). Pappas eventually took over
representation of the entire matter. Another attorney, James Thompson
(Thompson), began a joint representation with Pappas. One month before
trial, Pappas withdrew as the Holloways’ attorney with court permission.
The Holloways hired Douglas Shepherd (Shepherd) to assist Thompson
at trial. The trial resulted in a judgment against the Holloways of
approximately $2.9 million.50 Afterward, Pappas sued the Holloways for
his attorneys fees and the Holloways counterclaimed alleging Pappas had
committed legal malpractice. Pappas brought third-party complaints
against all of the attorneys who represented the Holloways in the
underlying litigation. He subsequently filed a motion to compel the thirdId.
Id. at 130, 813 S.E.2d at 791.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 130–31, 813 S.E.2d at 791–92.
47 308 Ga. at 79–80, 839 S.E.2d at 540.
48 114 Wash.2d 198, 787 P.2d 30 (1990).
49 Id. at 212–13, 787 P.2d at 39.
50 Id. at 199, 787 P.2d at 32.
43
44
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parties to produce documents relating to the Holloways’ insurance
coverage among other things. The third-party defendants objected to the
motion to compel, arguing that the requested documents were protected
by attorney-client privilege.51
The Washington Supreme Court recognized the importance of the
attorney-client privilege in encouraging free and open communication
between an attorney and their client.52 Further, noting that Pappas was
a case of first impression in Washington, the court extended the waiver
of attorney-client privilege to the third-parties, stating, “to allow the
Holloways to block Pappas’ request . . . would effectively deny him an
adequate defense,” and further recognized that the Holloway’s
counterclaim was what made malpractice an issue in the first place. 53
Relying on Pappas, a federal district court, in Rutgard v. Haynes,54
held that a plaintiff waived attorney-client privilege as to the files of an
attorney who defended the plaintiff in a malicious prosecution action.55
Richard Haynes (Haynes) sought to obtain the files of Gene E. Royce
(Royce) relating to Royce’s representation of Jeffrey Rutgard (Rutgard)
in a malicious prosecution action. Rutgard argued that only some of the
documents should be produced.56
The court held that just by filing suit for malpractice against one
attorney and placing protected communication at issue, the privilege is
waived as to all attorneys involved in the underlying litigation.57
However, the court placed a limit on the waiver, holding that “a party
does not place otherwise privileged information ‘at issue’ merely by
seeking an award of attorney fees as damages.”58 The court mentioned
that if Rutgard would have limited his claims to attorney’s fees the
waiver may not apply, but considering he sought other relief, the court
held that the privilege was waived.59
Not all courts freely extend the offensive use doctrine to unnamed
third parties. In Coates v. Akerman, Senterfitt & Eidson, P.A., 60 Bobby
and Deborah Coates (the Coates) along with three other entities sued
Akerman, Senterfitt & Eidson, P.A. (Akerman) as well as Joseph Rugg
Id. at 198–202, 787 P.2d at 30–33.
Id. at 203, 787 P.2d at 34.
53 Id. at 208–09, 787 P.2d at 36–37.
54 185 F.R.D. 596 (S.D. CA. 1999).
55 Id. at 602.
56 Id. at 597.
57 Id. at 597–98 (emphasis added).
58 Id. at 599.
59 Id.
60 Coates v. Akerman, Senterfitt, & Eidson, P.A., 940 So.2d 504 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d.
2006).
51
52
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(the attorneys) in connection with their representation regarding a tax
savings plan and the establishment of a joint venture. The Coates
retained Akerman in 1999 to provide legal services on an ongoing basis
in various personal and business matters. 61 In 2001 the Coates were
introduced to Temple Drummond (Drummond), another lawyer with
Akerman to discuss business tax, tax, and estate planning issues.
Drummond allegedly had expertise in those areas of law. Drummond
introduced the Coates to Lex Byers (Byers) who proposed a tax savings
plan that would “eliminate” the Coates’ tax liability. Drummond and
Byers also proposed a joint venture that involved offering the plan to
medical doctors. The Coates invested in the plan based on the expertise
of Drummond and Byers.62 It is unclear exactly what led to the legal
malpractice lawsuit but the Coates asserted various claims respect to
legal advice concerning the tax savings plan and the joint venture.63
Other professionals represented the Coates in various capacities
while they were considering the plan and the joint venture. During
discovery, the lawyers being sued for malpractice sought production of
documents relating to any legal advice that the Coates received from
individuals or entities other than the lawyers concerning the plan or joint
venture. The Coates produced some documents but asserted
attorney-client privilege as to others. The lawyers filed a motion to
compel production of the disputed documents. The lawyers argued that
the Coates “put at issue the advice . . .received from any other
professionals with respect to the [p]lan or the . . . [j]oint venture."64
The District Court of Appeal for the Second District of Florida held
that waiver of the attorney-client privilege is not favored in Florida.65
Florida refers to a substantially similar version of the offensive use
doctrine it calls “at issue” doctrine.66 In Florida, attorney-client privilege
is not waived simply by bringing or defending a lawsuit, but when a party
raises a claim that “will necessarily require proof by way of a privileged
communication,” in other words, if proof of the claim would require
evidence of the privileged information, the privilege is waived.67 The
court ruled that for the waiver to apply, the Coates would have to present
evidence of the privileged communications at trial to prove their claim.68

Id. at 506.
Id.
63 Id. at 504–07.
64 Id. at 507.
65 Id. at 508.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
61
62
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Recognizing that the Coates had not placed the privileged
communications at issue, their communications with other professionals
about the plan and joint venture, the privilege was not waived.69
While Coates stands for the proposition that other jurisdictions may
not have an expansive view of waiver of attorney-client privilege as to
third-parties, Georgia law makes it clear that rather than disfavoring
waiver of attorney-client privilege, the courts confine the privilege to its
“narrowest possible limits.”70
IV. COURT’S RATIONALE
In Hill, the Georgia Supreme Court mentioned that it was deciding
an issue of first impression in Georgia; more specifically, whether or not
the implied waiver that applies to legal malpractice described above
applies to other attorneys who represented the client-plaintiff in the
underlying matter that the client chose not to sue.71 The Court took into
consideration the rationale of both the trial court and the Georgia Court
of Appeals to inform its decision. 72
In short, the court began its analysis by citing the relevant section of
the Georgia Code and recognizing that it:
[A]uthorizes parties to civil lawsuits to 'obtain discovery regarding any
matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved
in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the
party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party.'73

The court followed by determining whether the scope of the discovery
requested by the parties was appropriate and recognizing that Holland
& Knight did not dispute that the discovery requested by HKW was
relevant; nor did Holland & Knight express they had no such
documents.74 The court describes the attorney-client privilege as “the
oldest of the common law privileges for confidential communications.”75
It recognized that the privilege exists to encourage “full and frank”
communications and to promote public interest in law and the
administration of justice, while also recognizing that sound legal advice

Id.
285 F.R.D. at 683.
71 308 Ga. at 74, 839 S.E.2d at 536.
72 Id. at 76–77, 839 S.E.2d at 538.
73 Id. at 78, 839 S.E.2d at 538.
74 Id. at 78, 839 S.E.2d at 538–39.
75 Id. at 78, 839 S.E.2d at 539 (citing St. Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, Maclean,
Exley & Dunn P.C., 293 Ga. 419, 746 S.E.2d 98 (2013)).
69
70
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or advocacy serves the public and that advice or advocacy depends “on
the lawyer’s being fully informed by the client.”76
The court further held that the application of the attorney-client
privilege is “narrowly construed” in Georgia based on its nature as a rule
of evidence that “impede[s] the search for the truth.”77 Citing Daughtry,
the court expressed that “a similar rationale requires recognition that the
implied waiver of the attorney-client privilege extends to other attorneys
who represented the plaintiff-client in the same underlying matter.”78
Therefore, by suing HKW, Moody put causation, reliance, and damages
into question, which all “may have been affected by other attorneys who
represented Plaintiffs in the same matters . . . .”79 Citing Pappas, the
Court reasoned that clients should not be allowed to file a claim against
a former attorney “and at the same time conceal from him
communications which have a direct bearing on this issue simply because
the attorney-client privilege protects them. To do so would in effect
enable them to use as a sword the protection which the Legislature
awarded them as a shield.”80 Noting that the findings made by the trial
court were entitled to substantial deference by the court of appeals, the
Georgia Supreme Court held the court of appeals erred in rejecting
them.81 Ultimately the court concluded that the “Court of Appeals should
have affirmed the trial court’s ruling that Plaintiffs were not entitled to
a protective order based on attorney-client privilege,” and reversed and
remanded with regard to the implied waiver of attorney-client privilege.82
V. IMPLICATIONS
Some jurisdictions recognize an expansive third-party waiver. The
sword and shield analogy seemed to be the rationale that the Georgia
Supreme Court most heavily relied on when making its final
determination, essentially expressing to future malpractice plaintiffs
that they may not have their cake and eat it too. More than likely, the
decision from Hill will have a greater effect on malpractice claims
involving complex litigation and large commercial transactions as these
run a greater risk of involving more than one lawyer or firm. However,
Hill does have implications in future malpractice litigation in general. It
is easy to fall into a trap and read Hill as a broad, sweeping decision that
Id. at 78–79, 839 S.E.2d at 539.
Id.
78 Id. at 79, 839 S.E.2d at 539 (emphasis added).
79 Id. at 79, 839 S.E.2d at 539–40.
80 Id. at 79, 839 S.E.2d at 540.
81 Id.
82 Id.
76
77
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weakens attorney-client privilege, taking the “shield” out of the plaintiff’s
hands if it were. In actuality Hill is a rather narrow ruling that clarifies
long-recognized law in Georgia. A party may not sue their former
attorney and keep that attorney from discovering relevant, onceprivileged information. When read closely Hill creates a factually
dependent application of third-party waiver.
The decision may also lead to paradoxical implications in future
Georgia legal malpractice litigation. Meaning the decision could open the
floodgates of litigation while also chilling litigation. It could encourage
more litigation in the sense that parties will decide to join all lawyers and
firms that play even a minor role in their underlying transaction or
litigation when they realize that any and all privileged information
between themselves and an attorney that represented them in the
underlying litigation is fair game for the defendant-attorney if the client
sues for malpractice. Therefore, the malpractice plaintiff might as well
see how many defendants they can join in a malpractice lawsuit.
Alternatively, Hill could chill legal malpractice litigation. Sophisticated,
commercial clients, realizing that potentially sensitive information might
be discoverable under Hill, may think twice before initiating a
malpractice suit.
Hill is really an example of the Georgia Supreme Court protecting its
attorneys by removing an unfair obstacle from the path of lawyers
attempting to defend themselves. Malpractice claims can ruin an
attorney’s career. Losing a malpractice suit may subject an attorney to a
financially ruinous judgment, could lead to punishment for violating
rules of professional conduct, and destroy an attorney’s most important
asset, their reputation. The court in Hill is protecting lawyers in Georgia
not by weakening the attorney-client privilege, but rather expanding and
strengthening attorneys’ ability to defend themselves. The third-party
waiver turns on the facts of an underlying case. The waiver only applies
to privileged information between a client and any attorney that
represented them in the same underlying matter. Stepping back and
taking a wide-angle view of underlying litigation helps make sense of the
ruling. For example, in Hill, Holland & Knight, while not at the helm of
the underlying litigation did in fact represent Moody during the
litigation, and served in an advisory role throughout. It only seems fair
that since Moody sued HKW for malpractice, HKW be afforded an
opportunity to discover information that might show that Holland &
Knight was at least somewhat liable for Moody’s alleged damages.
Hill should serve as a cautionary tale to readers, all attorneys in
general, and malpractice plaintiffs in the future. The attorney-client
privilege is and will likely always be reserved for the client. It is
construed narrowly in Georgia, but can be a powerful shield so long as
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the privilege is not abused. However, when a client makes the decision to
sue a former attorney or law firm for malpractice, they waive the
privilege, and may not also use the privilege as a sword to prevent the
defendant-attorney from obtaining discoverable information. After Hill,
the client not only waives privilege as to the firm they sue, but to any
firm or attorney that represented them in the underlying litigation.

D. Garrett White

